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The	   organization	   of	   production	   has	   represented	   a	   key	   issue	   to	   economics	   scholars	   since	   Adam	   Smith’s	  
Wealth	  of	  Nations	  (1776).	  The	  example	  of	  the	  pin	  factory	  or	  the	  one	  concerning	  the	  improvements	  in	  steam	  
engines,	   already	   called	   for	   the	   importance	   of	   division	   of	   labor,	   organization	   of	   production	   and	   the	  
relationships	   between	   process	   and	   organizational	   innovations.	   Later	   on,	   Alfred	   Marshall’s	   Principles	   of	  
Economics	   (1890)	   and	   Industry	   and	   Trade	   (1919)	   provided	   an	   analysis	   of	   the	   organization	   of	   production	  
within	  different	  industrial	  contexts,	  comparing	  different	  national	  systems.	  
However,	   business	   organization	   began	   to	   be	   included	   in	   a	  well	   defined	   field	   of	   enquiry	   only	   in	   the	   late	  
1930s,	   i.e.	   the	   theory	   of	   the	   firm.	  While	   the	   former	   approaches	   (Coase,	   1937)	  were	  much	   interested	   in	  
establishing	   a	   neo-­‐classical	   basis	   to	   the	   theory	   of	   the	   firm,	   in	   the	   1960s	   there	   was	   a	   change	   in	   the	  
intellectual	   climate	   influencing	   the	   development	   of	   the	   discipline,	   leading	   to	   the	   introduction	   of	   the	   so-­‐
called	   managerial	   and	   behavioral	   theories,	   and	   then	   to	   the	   transaction	   costs	   approach	   proposed	   by	  
Williamson.	  
The	   shift	   away	   from	   the	   neo-­‐classical	   approach	   to	   the	   theory	   of	   the	   firm	   was	   much	   influenced	   by	   the	  
increasing	   awareness	   that	   the	   post-­‐war	   international	   economy	   was	   farther	   and	   farther	   from	   a	   perfect	  
competition	   situation.	   The	   use	   of	   markets	   ceased	   to	   appear	   as	   costless,	   and	   it	   was	   clear	   that	   in	   many	  
countries,	  like	  France,	  Germany	  and	  the	  United	  States,	  firms	  appeared	  more	  as	  large	  corporations	  carrying	  
out	   many,	   if	   not	   all,	   of	   the	   stage	   of	   the	   production	   process,	   rather	   than	   as	   tiny	   and	   non-­‐influential	  
productive	   units.	   The	   evidence	   provided	   by	   Alfred	   Chandler	   (1962	   and	   1977)	   demonstrated	   that	   the	  
industries	   that	   benefited	   from	   the	   technological	   system	   characterizing	   the	   so-­‐called	   Second	   Industrial	  
Revolution	  showed	  larger	  and	  capital	  intensive	  production	  units,	  able	  to	  pursue	  scale	  and	  scope	  economies	  
so	  as	  to	  gain	  higher	  profit	  margins.	  The	  US	  large	  and	  diversified	  corporation,	  organized	  as	  multi-­‐divisional	  
hierarchy,	   was	   seen	   as	   a	   sort	   of	   optimum	   towards	   which	   all	   industrial	   systems	   should	   have	   converged	  
sooner	  or	  later	  in	  order	  to	  retain	  competitiveness	  and	  stay	  in	  the	  market.	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Such	  stream	  of	  literature	  represents	  the	  first	  attempt	  to	  identify	  an	  ideal	  type	  of	  firm,	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  which	  
clear	  prescriptions	  could	  have	  been	  formulated.	  In	  the	  mid	  1980s	  the	  interest	  of	  business	  historians	  began	  
to	  move	  towards	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  distinctive	  features	  characterizing	  Japanese	  firms	  (Aoki,	  1990;	  Aoki	  and	  
Dore,	   1994).	   The	   phenomenology	   of	   the	   Japanese	   firms	   has	   then	   been	   studied	   under	   different	  
perspectives,	  emphasizing	  the	  specificity	  of	  their	  internal	  structure	  as	  well	  as	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  network	  
of	   relationships	   in	   which	   they	   operate,	   made	   up	   of	   both	   economic	   and	   institutional	   actors.	   A	   pretty	  
interesting	   picture	   has	   then	   emerged	   that	   on	   the	   one	   hand	   shed	   light,	   at	   least	   in	   part,	   on	   the	   reasons	  
underlying	  their	  success,	  and	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  provided	  new	  challenges	  to	  the	  theory	  of	  the	  firm	  (see	  the	  
chapter	  by	  Lechevalier	  in	  this	  book).	  
More	   recently,	   a	   new	   stream	   of	   literature	   appeared,	   following	   the	   increasing	   integration	   of	   European	  
countries	   and	   globalization	   of	   European	   firms.	   The	   emergence	   and	   the	   gradual	   hardening	   of	   the	   Single	  
European	  Market	  raised	  the	  important	   issue	  as	  to	  what	  should	  be	  the	  future	  of	  business	  organization	  for	  
European	   firms.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	   scholars	  have	  maintained	   that	   the	  chance	   to	  confront	  with	   larger	  and	  
larger	  markets	  should	  lead	  to	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  sort	  US-­‐like	  European	  multidivisional	  firm,	  able	  to	  get	  
significant	  rents	  due	  to	  market	  power	  and	  technical	  economies	  of	  scale.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  increasing	  
literature	  showing	  the	  advantages	  of	  outsourcing	  and	  of	  networking	  firms	  proposed	  flexible	  and	  specialized	  
firms	   as	   the	   model	   towards	   which	   industrial	   systems	   in	   Europe	   should	   have	   converged.	   A	   different	  
approach	   to	   the	   issue	   has	   been	   synthesized	   in	   a	   recent	   volume	   edited	   by	   Richard	   Withley	   and	   Hull	  
Krinstensen	  (1996),	  the	  contributions	  of	  which	  set	  out	  a	  framework	  based	  on	  social	  contingency	  and	  social	  
choice.	  According	  to	  this	  strand	  of	  literature,	  a	  unique	  ideal-­‐type	  of	  European	  firm	  can	  hardly	  be	  devised,	  
due	   to	   the	   social,	   political	   and	   institutional	   variety	   that	   characterizes	   the	   different	   European	   countries.	  
Moreover,	   similar	   economic	   agents	   in	   different	   economic	   contexts	   may	   be	   motivated	   by	   different	  
objectives,	  so	  that	  the	  analysis	  of	  economic	  choices	  would	  not	  be	  necessarily	  the	  same.	  
The	  purpose	  of	   this	  chapter	   is	   to	  provide	  an	  extended	  overview	  on	  the	  debate	  on	  the	  European	  firm,	  by	  
articulating	   it	  against	   the	  backdrop	  of	  more	   traditional	   theories	  of	   the	   firm.	  The	  chapter	  also	  proposes	  a	  
different	   interpretation	   of	   the	   issue	   by	   grafting	   the	   discussion	   into	   the	   interpretative	   framework	   of	  
complexity	  theory,	  so	  as	  to	  provide	  a	  new	  and	  possibly	  richer	  heuristic.	  The	  rest	  of	  the	  chapter	  is	  organized	  
as	  follows.	  Section	  2	  provides	  a	  review	  of	  main	  theories	  of	  the	  firm,	  from	  early	  neo-­‐classical	  to	  more	  recent	  
evolutionary	  approaches.	   In	  Section	  3	  we	  go	   into	  the	  debate	  about	  the	  perspectives	  for	  a	  European	  firm,	  
emphasizing	  the	  importance	  of	  local	  idiosyncratic	  factors	  in	  shaping	  the	  technology	  of	  production.	  We	  will	  
argue	   that	   key	  economists	   like	  Alfred	  Marshall,	   Simon	  Kuznets	  and	   Joseph	  Schumpeter	  already	  provided	  
the	  bases	  for	  a	  contingency-­‐based	  approach.	  Section	  4	  develops	  a	  complexity	  approach	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  
European	  firm	  from	  a	  dynamic	  viewpoint,	  while	  Section	  5	  presents	  the	  conclusions	  and	  suggests	  possible	  




2 Theories	  of	  the	  firm:	  an	  overview	  
2.1 The	  neoclassical	  theory	  of	  the	  firm	  
In	  the	  Neoclassical	  Theory,	  the	  firm	  is	  conceptualized	  as	  a	  black	  box	  rational	  entity.	  The	  theory	  builds	  upon	  
production	  and	  demand	  functions	  where	  the	  firm	  is	  described	  as	  a	  production	  function	  which	  transforms	  
inputs	  into	  outputs.	  According	  to	  this	  theory,	  the	  firm	  maximizes	  its	  profit	  under	  the	  assumption	  of	  perfect	  
rationality.	  	  
The	   main	   limit	   of	   this	   theory	   is	   that	   it	   does	   not	   take	   into	   account	   the	   internal	   structure	   of	   the	   firm	  
conceived	  as	  a	  black	  box.	  It	  does	  not	  help	  in	  explaining	  how	  production	  is	  organized	  and	  governed	  or	  how	  
profit	  maximization	   is	   achieved.	  Moreover,	   traditional	   economic	   analysis	   neglects	   the	   boundaries	   of	   the	  
firm	  and,	  consequently,	  does	  not	  help	   in	  explaining	  what	  determines	  vertical	  or	  horizontal	   integration.	   It	  
also	  neglects	  the	  conflict	  of	  interests	  between	  economic	  actors	  arising	  from	  asymmetries	  of	  information	  as	  
it	  assumes	  complete	  information.	  Finally,	  it	  mainly	  deals	  with	  static	  equilibrium	  analysis	  and	  thus	  does	  not	  
account	  for	  firms	  dynamics.	  
2.2 The	  transaction	  costs	  theory	  of	  the	  firm	  
In	  transaction	  costs	  economics	  the	  firm	  is	  not	  described	  as	  a	  production	  function	  but	  is	  conceptualized	  as	  a	  
governance	  structure.	  This	  theory	  is	  based	  on	  the	  assumption	  of	  bounded	  rationality	  and	  opportunism.	  One	  
of	   the	   main	   contributions	   of	   the	   transaction	   costs	   view	   is	   that	   it	   tries	   to	   go	   inside	   the	   black	   box	   and	  
understand	  the	  firm’s	  internal	  structure.	  In	  particular,	  the	  transaction	  costs	  theory	  focuses	  on	  the	  make-­‐or-­‐
buy	  decision	  in	  the	  context	  of	  vertical	  integration.	  	  
In	  his	  pioneer	  article	  The	  Nature	  of	  the	  Firm	  Coase	  developed	  the	  approach	  to	  the	  theory	  of	  the	  firm	  based	  
on	  transaction	  costs.	  According	  to	  Coase,	  within	  a	  firm	  market	  transactions	  based	  on	  price	  mechanisms	  are	  
eliminated	   and	   the	   production	   is	   coordinated	   by	   the	   entrepreneur.	   “A	   firm	   consists	   of	   the	   system	   of	  
relationships	   which	   comes	   into	   existence	   when	   the	   direction	   of	   resources	   is	   dependent	   on	   an	  
entrepreneur”	  (Coase	  1937,	  p.	  393).	  In	  this	  view,	  the	  entrepreneur	  coordinates	  transactions	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  
minimizing	   his	   costs	   function.	   Thus,	   a	   firm	   emerges	  when	   the	   costs	   of	   production	   factors	   are	   lower	   if	   a	  
certain	  transaction	  is	  carried	  out	  within	  the	  firm	  rather	  than	  in	  the	  open	  market.	  Yet,	  the	  exact	  nature	  of	  
transactions	  is	  not	  well	  specified	  by	  Coase.	  
The	  contribution	  of	  Oliver	  Williamson	  to	  this	  theory	  is	  important	  in	  that	  has	  gone	  in-­‐depth	  the	  analysis	  of	  
transaction	   costs	   that	   determine	   the	   decision	   to	   make	   or	   buy	   and	   has	   described	   the	   main	   governance	  
structures	  of	  transactions.	  According	  to	  Williamson,	  three	  main	  attribute	  helps	   in	  describing	  transactions:	  
“the	  frequency	  with	  which	  transactions	  recur,	  the	  uncertainty	  –	  disturbances	  -­‐	  to	  which	  they	  are	  subject,	  
and	   the	  condition	  of	  asset	   specificity”	   (Williamson,	  1998,	  p.	  36).	   In	   this	   view,	  a	   firm	  decides	   to	  vertically	  
integrate	  when	  transactions	  are	  frequent,	  have	  high	  uncertainty	  because	  of	  information	  asymmetries	  and	  
involve	  highly	  specific	  assets.	  Williamson	  also	  identifies	  three	  broad	  types	  of	  governance	  structures	   i)	  the	  
market,	   which	   is	   non-­‐transactions-­‐specific	   ii)	   transaction-­‐specific	   governance	   that	   are	   adapted	   to	   the	  
special	   needs	   of	   the	   transactions	   and	   iii)	   transactions-­‐semi-­‐specific,	   which	   fall	   in	   between.	   According	   to	  
Williamson,	  transactions	  and	  governance	  structures	  are	  aligned	  in	  order	  to	  economize	  transaction	  costs.	  
Although	  the	  transaction	  costs	  theory	  addresses	  some	  of	  the	  weakness	  of	  the	  neoclassical	  theory,	  it	  is	  not	  
without	   its	   critics.	   First,	   it	   begs	   the	   question	   of	   how	   profit	   maximization	   that	   is	   costs	   minimization	   is	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achieved.	  Even	  if	  transaction	  costs	  theory	  assumes	  asymmetries	  of	  information,	  it	  still	  neglects	  the	  conflict	  
of	  interests	  between	  economic	  actors	  and	  agency	  costs.	  Finally,	  it	  does	  not	  allow	  for	  firm	  evolution.	  
2.3 The	  principal	  agent	  theory	  of	  the	  firm	  
In	  the	  principal	  agent	  theory	  (Jensen	  and	  Meckling,	  1976),	  the	  firm	  is	  conceived	  as	  a	  nexus	  for	  a	  set	  of	  
contracting	  relationships	  among	  individuals.	  As	  the	  neoclassical	  theory,	  it	   is	  based	  on	  the	  principle	  of	  
maximizing	  behaviour	  on	  the	  part	  of	  all	  individuals.	  Yet,	  an	  individual	  aims	  at	  maximising	  his	  own	  utility	  
and	  this	  may	  generate	  conflicts	  of	  interest	  between	  different	  economic	  actors.	  
In	  particular,	  the	  principal	  agent	  theory	  focuses	  on	  the	  contracts	  between	  the	  owners	  and	  managers	  of	  
the	   firm	   and	   investigates	   the	   efficiency	   of	   the	   separation	   of	   ownership	   and	   control	   as	   a	   form	   of	  
organization.	  The	  agency	  relationship	  involves	  the	  principal,	  which	  is	  the	  owner	  and	  risk	  bearer	  of	  the	  
firm,	   and	   the	   agent,	   which	   is	   the	   manager	   and	   the	   decision	   maker.	   As	   both	   of	   them	   are	   utility	  
maximizers,	   the	   theory	   assumes	   that	   the	   manager	   will	   not	   always	   act	   in	   the	   best	   interests	   of	   the	  
owner.	   The	   divergence	   between	   the	   agent’s	   decision	   and	   the	   optimal	   decision	   from	   the	   principal’s	  
perspective	  of	  profit	  maximization	  engenders	  the	  agency	  costs	  related	  to	  the	  losses	  in	  profits	  and	  the	  
monitoring	  expenditures	  by	  the	  principal,	  and	  to	  the	  bonding	  expenditures	  by	  the	  agent.	  Under	  these	  
conditions,	   the	   principal	   agent	   theory	   investigates	   the	   incentives	   faced	   by	   both	   the	   principal	   and	   the	  
agent	   within	   their	   contractual	   relationship.	   In	   particular,	   the	   literature	   has	   mainly	   focused	   on	   the	  
incentive	  schemes	  that	  align	  the	  manager’s	  objectives	  with	  the	  owner’s	  interests.	  
This	   theory	   has	   some	   weaknesses.	   As	   the	   neoclassical	   theory	   of	   the	   firm,	   it	   still	   fails	   to	   define	   the	  
boundaries	  of	   the	   firm.	  Moreover,	   it	   still	  mainly	  deals	  with	   static	   equilibrium	  analysis	   and	   thus	  does	  not	  
allow	  for	  firm	  evolution.	  2.4 The	  resource	  based	  view	  and	  the	  evolutionary	  theory	  of	  the	  firm	  
The	  resource-­‐based	  theory	  analyses	  the	  firm	  from	  the	  resource	  side	  rather	  than	  the	  product	  side.	  The	  idea	  
of	  looking	  at	  the	  firm	  as	  a	  set	  of	  resources	  has	  its	  roots	  in	  the	  work	  by	  Penrose	  (1959)	  and	  emphasizes	  the	  
role	  of	   critical	   resources	   in	   shaping	   firms’	  evolution	  and	  growth	   (Rumelt,	  1984;	  Teece,	  1984;	  Wernerfelt,	  
1984;	   Dierickx	   and	   Cool,	   1989;	   Barney,	   1991).	   As	   the	   transaction	   costs	   theory,	   the	   resource	   based	   view	  
looks	   inside	   the	   black	   box,	   in	   particular,	   by	   focusing	   on	   the	   resources	   it	   owns	   and	   assumes	   bounded	  
rationality.	   Yet,	   it	   is	   based	   on	   the	   knowledge	   based	   approach	   rather	   than	   the	   opportunistic-­‐based	   view	  
(Conner	  and	  Prahalad,	  1996).	  	  
According	   to	   the	   resource-­‐based	  view	  of	   the	   firm	  a	   critical	   resource	   can	  be	  either	   a	  person	  or	   a	   specific	  
asset	  that	  cannot	  be	  easily	  imitated	  and	  differentiates	  a	  firm	  from	  its	  competitors.	  A	  number	  of	  works	  has	  
pointed	   out	   that	   knowledge,	   skills	   and	   experience	   are	   the	   major	   source	   of	   sustainable	   competitive	  
advantage	  and	  new	  opportunities	  exploitation	  (Winter,	  1987;	  Prahalad	  and	  Hamel,	  1990).	  	  
In	  line	  with	  this	  theory,	  Teece	  et	  al.	  (1997)	  has	  developed	  the	  concept	  of	  dynamic	  capabilities	  referring	  to	  
the	  ability	  of	  adapting	  organizational	  skills,	  resources	  and	  competences	  to	  changing	  environment.	  “Dynamic	  
capabilities	   thus	   reflect	   an	   organization’s	   ability	   to	   achieve	   new	   and	   innovative	   forms	   of	   competitive	  
advantage	  given	  path	  dependencies	  and	  market	  positions”	  (Teece	  et	  al.	  1997,	  p.	  516).	  
The	  evolutionary	   theory	  of	   the	   firm	  offers	  an	  alternative	  definition	  of	   the	   firm	  based	  on	   routines.	   In	   the	  
evolutionary	   theory	  proposed	  by	  Nelson	  and	  Winter	   (1982),	   the	   firm	   is	   still	  motivated	  by	  profit	  as	   in	   the	  
neoclassical	  view	  yet	   it	   is	  not	  analysed	   in	  equilibrium	  conditions	  but	   it	   is	  assumed	  to	  operate	   in	  an	  open	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ended	  dynamic	  process.	   In	  this	  view	  a	  firm	  can	  be	  defined	  through	  the	  set	  of	  routines	  and	  competencies	  
that	  the	  firm	  encompasses.	  As	  routines	  and	  competences	  are	  firm	  specific	  and	  differ	  among	  different	  firms,	  
the	   evolutionary	   theory	   conceives	   firms	   as	   heterogeneous	   economic	   agents.	   In	   order	   to	   survive,	  
heterogeneous	   firms	  compete	   in	   the	  market	  by	  employing	  new	  techniques	  and	  producing	  at	   lower	  costs	  
than	   their	   competitors.	   Firms	   evolution	   is	   thus	   driven	   by	   technological	   competition	   and	   selection	  
mechanisms,	  on	  one	  hand,	  and	  innovation	  processes,	  on	  the	  other	  hand.	  
While	  addressing	  some	  of	  the	  issues	  related	  to	  the	  more	  traditional	  theories,	  the	  resource-­‐based	  and	  the	  
evolutionary	  theories	  have	  their	  own	  limitations.	  Although	  the	  resource	  based	  view	  looks	  inside	  the	  black	  
box	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  resources	  it	  owns,	  in	  the	  evolutionary	  theory	  the	  firm	  still	  a	  black	  box.	  The	  boundaries	  
of	  the	  firm	  are	  still	  not	  defined	  and	  the	  issues	  related	  to	  the	  separation	  of	  ownership	  and	  control	  are	  not	  
accounted	  for.	  
3 The	  European	  Firm:	  an	  open	  debate	  
	  
Most	  of	  the	  theories	  of	  the	  firm	  reviewed	  so	  far	  share	  a	  common	  limit	  which	  has	  somehow	  influenced	  the	  
debate	  on	   the	  more	  appropriate	  organization	  of	  production	   in	  modern	  capitalistic	   societies.	  They	   indeed	  
end	  up	  to	  propose,	  more	  or	  less	  explicitly,	  a	  sort	  of	  ideal	  organizational	  structure	  in	  the	  continuum	  between	  
markets	  and	  hierarchies,	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  comparison	  between	  specific	  advantages	  and	  disadvantages.	  
On	   the	   one	   hand,	   earlier	   approaches	   view	   the	   firm	   as	   a	   nexus	   of	   contracts.	   The	   main	   pillars	   of	   the	  
production	  process	  are	  therefore	  transactions	  carried	  out	  within	  market	  dynamics.	   In	  this	  direction,	  firms	  
take	   the	   typical	   form	  expected	   in	  competitive	  markets	  and	  predicted	  by	   traditional	  neoclassical	   theories.	  
On	   the	   other	   hand,	   subsequent	   schools	   of	   thought	   have	   emphasized	   the	   importance	   of	   information	  
asymmetries	  and	  the	  risk	  for	  moral	  hazard	  and	  adverse	  selection	  in	  favoring	  the	  development	  of	  larger	  and	  
vertically	   integrated	  production	  units	   (Williamson,	  1975).	   In	  addition,	   the	   focus	  on	  differential	  objectives	  
featuring	  owners	  and	  managers	  led	  to	  stressing	  the	  advantages	  of	  managerial	  firms,	  as	  different	  from	  those	  
in	  which	  ownership	  and	  control	  are	  concentrated	  in	  the	  same	  persons	  (Jensen	  and	  Meckling,	  1976).	  
The	   search	   for	   an	  archetypical	  organizational	   form	  also	   inspired	  empirical	  works	   in	  business	  history.	   The	  
main	  reference	  is	  in	  this	  respect	  the	  voluminous	  works	  by	  Alfred	  Chandler	  (1962	  and	  1977).	  In	  his	  analysis	  
of	  the	  co-­‐evolution	  of	  organizational	  forms	  and	  western	  capitalism,	  Chandler	  stressed	  that	  the	  emergence	  
of	   the	   diversified	   and	  multidivisional	   form	   could	   have	   been	   regarded	   as	   the	   heyday	   of	   the	   evolution	   of	  
modern	   economies.	   While	   single	   and	   family	   owned	   businesses	   were	   mainly	   typical	   of	   the	   industries	  
featuring	  the	  First	  Industrial	  Revolution,	  the	  Second	  one	  was	  instead	  characterized	  by	  the	  rise	  of	  chemical	  
and	  pharmaceutical	  productions	  as	  well	  as	   the	   introduction	  of	  new	  technologies,	   like	   the	  electricity,	   that	  
made	   production	   processes	   much	   faster	   and	   cheaper.	   The	   new	   industries	   were	   showed	   also	   peculiar	  
technical	  features	  according	  to	  which	  the	  minimum	  efficiency	  scale	  was	  pretty	  high,	  partly	  as	  an	  effect	  of	  
the	  sunk	  costs	  needed	  to	  implement	  effective	  factories.	  The	  prospects	  for	  scale	  and	  scope	  economies	  were	  
therefore	   out	   of	   the	   main	   factors	   leading	   to	   emergence	   of	   large	   corporations	   in	   the	   Second	   Industrial	  
Revolution.	  	  
Both	  Chandler	  and	  Williamson	  tended	  to	  represent	  the	  M-­‐form	  typical	  of	  American	  capitalism	  as	  a	  superior	  
form	  of	  organization.	   The	   former	   in	  particular	  proposed	   that	   there	   clearly	  was	  an	   increasing	  diffusion	  of	  
such	   a	   kind	   of	   organization	   amongst	   most	   advanced	   economies.	   A	   convergence	   process	   was	   about	   to	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display	   its	   effects,	   concerning	   the	   “type	   of	   enterprise	   and	   system	   of	   capitalism	   used	   by	   all	   advanced	  
economies	   for	   the	  production	  and	  distribution	  of	  goods”	   (Chandler,	  1992	  [1984]:	  p.	  156).	  This	  process	  of	  
convergence	  was	  likely	  to	  interest	  both	  European	  and	  the	  Japanese	  governance	  of	  firms’	  groups.	  
These	  latter,	  however,	  offered	  some	  years	  later	  the	  chance	  to	  extend	  and	  reshape	  the	  ongoing	  debate.	  The	  
evidence	  about	  the	  peculiar	  organization	  of	  Japanese	  firms’	  group	  typical	  of	  keiretsu	  systems	  did	  cast	  some	  
doubts	  on	  the	  pretended	  universality	  of	  the	  American	  multi-­‐divisional	  firm.	  The	  virtues	  of	  this	  governance	  
scheme	  grounded	  on	  outsourcing,	  informal	  ties	  and	  the	  emphasis	  of	  core	  businesses	  were	  so	  evident	  that	  
Williamson	  himself	  had	  to	  admit	  that	  the	  keiretsu	  organization	  could	  have	  been	  regarded	  as	  much	  effective	  
as	  the	  M-­‐form	  (Williamson,	  1993).	  
On	   this	   bases,	   the	  discourse	   on	   the	   nature	   of	   European	   firms	   began	   to	   assume	   a	   different	   perspective,	  
along	  with	  increasing	  awareness	  that	  different	  varieties	  of	  capitalism	  were	  possible	  (Hall	  and	  Soskice;	  xxx)	  
and	   hence	   that	   different	   ways	   of	   organizing	   the	   production	   process	   could	   have	   co-­‐existed	   at	   the	   same	  
historical	  time,	  as	  an	  effect	  of	  different	  idiosyncratic	  characteristics	  featuring	  local	  contexts.	  	  
3.1 Role	  of	  the	  industrial	  structure	  
	  
Such	  awareness	  could	  hardly	  be	  regarded	  as	  brand	  new	  achievement	  in	  economic	  theory.	  The	  link	  between	  
the	  organization	  of	  production	  and	  industrial	  peculiarities	  were	  indeed	  already	  emphasized,	  for	  example,	  in	  
the	   works	   by	   Alfred	   Chandler.	   International	   differences	   were	   regarded	   as	   sort	   of	   out-­‐of-­‐equilibrium	  
situations,	   which	   however	   would	   have	   ended	   up	   to	   the	   ideal-­‐form.	   The	   seminal	   contributions	   by	   two	  
founding	  economists,	  i.e.	  Alfred	  Marshall	  and	  Simon	  Kuznets,	  may	  help	  enriching	  the	  framework.	  
Marshall’s	  masterpiece	  (1890)	   is	   famous	  for	  having	  set	  up	  the	  principles	  of	  partial	  equilibrium	  analysis	  as	  
well	   as	   for	   having	   analyzed	   in	   detail	   the	   British	   production	   environment	   during	   the	   First	   Industrial	  
Revolution.	  The	  celebrated	  concept	  of	  industrial	  districts	  originated	  therein,	  and	  has	  represented,	  and	  still	  
represents,	  for	  some	  economists	  the	  best	  possible	  world	  towards	  which	  local	  production	  systems	  ought	  to	  
converge,	  though	  Marshall’s	  analysis	  was	  positive	  rather	  than	  normative.	  His	  other	  important	  contribution	  
Industry	  and	  Trade	  (1919)	  has	  been	  less	  fortunate,	  despite	  the	  richness	  and	  the	  broad	  empirical	  context	  of	  
analysis.	   In	   this	   work	   Marshall	   carries	   out	   an	   interesting	   comparison	   among	   the	   sources	   of	   industrial	  
leadership	  in	  Great	  Britain,	  France,	  Germany	  and	  United	  States,	  emphasizing	  the	  co-­‐existence	  of	  different	  
forms	  of	  business	  organization	  in	  different	  countries,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  institutional	  setting,	  
like	  the	  access	  conditions	  to	  financial	  resources,	  fiscal	  policies	  and	  the	  degree	  of	  competition,	  besides	  the	  
traditional	   influence	   of	   technical	   factors.	   Marshall’s	   work	   in	   sum	   contained	   all	   the	   ingredients	   for	   a	  
‘relativist’	   theory	   of	   the	   firm,	   appreciating	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   specific	   features	   of	   industrial	   and	  
geographical	  contexts.	  
A	   few	   years	   later	   Simon	   Kuznets	   (1930)	   proposed	   an	   interesting	   analysis	   of	   the	   cyclical	   behavior	   of	  
industries,	  able	  to	  explain	  how	  the	  economic	  leadership	  moved	  from	  some	  countries	  to	  others	  according	  to	  
the	   relative	   stage	   of	   lifecycles	   that	   characterizes	   the	   industries	   they	   are	   specialized	   in.	   Such	   evolution,	  
mainly	   grounded	   on	   technological	   factors,	   is	   likely	   to	   explain	   for	   example	   the	   gradual	   shift	   of	   industrial	  
leadership	   and	   the	   related	   effects	   on	   economic	   growth.	   Kuznets’	   analysis	   enables	   to	   appreciate	   the	  
dynamic	   character	   of	   economic	   structure.	   The	  performance	  of	   industries	   exhibit	   a	   cyclical	   behavior,	   and	  
some	  countries	  are	   likely	   to	   take	   the	   lead	  at	  a	  given	  historical	   time,	  while	   some	  other	  ones	  are	   likely	   to	  
replace	  them	  when	  their	  core	  industries	  undergo	  the	  phase	  of	  growth.	  Structural	  change	  is	  a	  key	  element	  
of	   economic	   life.	   Along	   with	   Marshall’s	   remark	   on	   the	   close	   relationship	   between	   the	   organization	   of	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production	  and	  the	  peculiarities	  of	  industrial	  sectors,	  such	  contributions	  allows	  for	  understanding	  how	  hard	  
is	  to	  find	  out	  a	  unique	  firm	  model.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  there	   is	  a	  changing	  variety	  of	   industries,	  both	  across	  
countries	   at	   the	   same	   time	   and	   over	   time	   within	   the	   same	   country.	   Each	   industry	   is	   likely	   to	   be	  
characterized	  by	  a	  form	  of	  business	  organization	  that	  better	  fits	  with	  the	  features	  of	  production.	  This	  was	  
explicitly	  advanced	  by	  Kuznets,	  who	  emphasized	  how	   in	  modern	  economies	   “Major	  aspects	  of	   structural	  
change	   include	   the	   shift	   away	   from	   agriculture	   to	   non-­‐agriculture	   pursuits	   and,	   recently,	   away	   from	  
industry	  to	  services;	  a	  change	  in	  the	  scale	  of	  production	  units,	  and	  a	  related	  shift	  from	  personal	  enterprise	  
to	   impersonal	   organization	   of	   economic	   firms	   (Kuznets,	   1973:	   p.248,	   italics	   added).	   For	   this	   reason	   the	  
search	  for	  an	  ideal	  firm	  form	  would	  appear	  an	  abstraction	  too	  far	  from	  what	  can	  be	  empirically	  observed.	  
	  
3.2 Innovation	  and	  path-­dependence	  
	  
The	  interest	  in	  the	  dynamics	  of	  structural	  change	  can	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  distinctive	  feature	  of	  the	  intellectual	  
climate	  established	  in	  the	  1930s	  in	  the	  fields	  of	  economics.	  Shortly	  after	  Kuznets’	  book,	  Joseph	  Schumpeter	  
published	  indeed	  the	  Business	  cycle	  (1939),	  in	  which	  he	  treated	  to	  a	  great	  extent	  the	  intertwining	  between	  
industrial	   and	   technology	   lifecycles.	   The	   dynamics	   of	   technological	   change	   is	   at	   the	   same	   time	   both	   a	  
determinant	  and	  an	  outcome	  of	  economic	  dynamics.	  As	  a	  scholar	  of	  economics	  of	  innovation,	  Schumpeter	  
provided	  both	   theoretical	  and	  empirical	   contributions	   that	  are	  pretty	  consistent	  with	   the	  criticism	  of	   the	  
universalist	  approach	  typical	  of	  the	  supporters	  of	  the	  M-­‐form.	  
In	   his	   Theory	   of	   Economic	   Development	   (1912),	   he	   proposed	   indeed	   a	   taxonomy	   of	   innovations,	   out	   of	  
which	   process	   innovations	   and,	   more	   explicitly,	   organizational	   innovation	   bear	   precisely	   on	   the	   way	   in	  
which	  firms	  carry	  out	  the	  production	  process.	  Schumpeter	  maintained	  that	  the	  organization	  of	  production	  
is	   subject	   to	  change,	  and	   that	   the	  changes	   in	   the	   institutional	  and	  economic	  environment	   in	  which	   firms	  
operate	   are	   likely	   to	   influence	   such	   dynamics.	   All	   the	  more,	   his	   works	   are	   a	   clear	   clue	   of	   this	   process.	  
Indeed,	   in	   the	   above	   mentioned	   book	   Schumpeter	   identifies	   the	   entrepreneur	   as	   the	   main	   engine	   of	  
economic	   growth.	   The	   small	   family-­‐owned	   company,	   built	   around	   an	   innovative	   idea,	   represents	   the	  
desirable	  organizational	  form.	  The	  access	  to	  credit,	  in	  particular	  thanks	  to	  the	  bank	  system,	  is	  in	  turn	  an	  key	  
enabling	  condition.	  Later	  on,	  in	  Capitalism,	  Socialism	  and	  Democracy	  (1942),	  Schumpeter	  changed	  his	  mind,	  
stressing	  how	  it	  is	  the	  large	  and	  monopolistic	  firm	  to	  provide	  the	  economy	  with	  the	  necessary	  impulse	  to	  
change	  and	  growth.	  A	   temporary	  monopoly	   is	  necessary	  according	   to	  Schumpeter	   in	  order	   to	  guarantee	  
sufficient	  extra-­‐profits	  for	  firms	  having	  invested	  large	  amounts	  to	  resource	  to	  research	  and	  development.	  
The	   financing	   of	   innovation	   becomes	   more	   an	   internal	   business	   rather	   than	   an	   activity	   sustained	   by	  
external	  credit.	  
Schumpeter’s	   works	   therefore	   show	   how	   interpretative	   lens	   are	   strictly	   related	   to	   the	   esprit	   du	   temps.	  
Different	   organizational	   forms	   appear	   to	   be	   equally	   effective,	   depending	   on	   the	   features	   of	   the	   actual	  
economic	  and	  institutional	  environments.	  His	  works	  also	  point	  to	  the	  importance	  of	  history	  in	  economics,	  
and	   therefore	   to	   need	   for	   an	   evolutionary	   approach	   to	   economics.	   The	   conditions	   in	   which	   economic	  
agents	  operate	  are	  far	  from	  static	  and	  immutable,	  but	  economic	  agents	  make	  their	  plans	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  
actual	   observed	   parameters.	   Therefore,	   when	   conditions	   change,	   agents	   react	   by	   introducing	   different	  




In	  this	  direction	  the	  M-­‐form	  is	  only	  one	  of	  the	  possible	  organizational	  forms,	  which	  is	  strictly	  related	  to	  the	  
set	  of	  idiosyncratic	  features	  impinging	  upon	  specific	  industrial	  and	  geographical	  contexts	  at	  given	  moments	  
in	   time.	   The	   economics	   of	   path-­‐dependence	   provides	   insightful	   complementary	   inputs	   in	   this	   respect.	   A	  
path	   dependent	   process	   is	   one	   in	   which	   remote	   events,	   both	   systematic	   and	   stochastic,	   can	   exert	  
important	   influences	  on	   the	   final	  outcome.	  Stochastic	  processes	  not	  converging	   to	  single	  equilibrium	  are	  
called	  non-­‐ergodic.	  Within	   this	   framework,	   the	   set	  of	   historical	   accidents	  needs	   to	  be	   accounted	   for	   the	  
purpose	  of	  economic	  analysis.	  A	  path-­‐dependent	  process	  is	  therefore	  one	  in	  which	  multiple	  equilibria	  are	  
possible,	  due	  to	  the	  essentially	  historically	  character	  of	  the	  dynamic	  process	  under	  scrutiny	  (David,	  1985).	  	  
The	   economics	   of	   path-­‐dependence	   has	   been	   successfully	   applied	   to	   the	   analysis	   of	   innovation	   and	  
integrate	  in	  the	  localized	  technological	  change	  approach	  (Antonelli,	  1995	  and	  1999).	  The	  basic	  ingredients	  
of	  this	  framework	  are	  well	  suited	  to	  provide	  further	  theoretical	  support	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  it	  quite	  difficult	  to	  
expect	  business	  organization	   to	  converge	   to	  a	   fixed-­‐point	  distribution	  of	  outcomes.	  On	   the	  contrary,	   the	  
dynamics	  of	  economic	  processes	  is	  such	  that	  the	  observed	  outcome	  at	  a	  given	  point	  in	  time	  is	  the	  result	  of	  
a	  sequence	  of	  actions,	  according	  to	  which	  each	  action	  at	  time	  t	  is	  likely	  to	  shape	  actions	  at	  time	  t+1,	  raising	  
a	  chain	  of	  unpredictable	  events.	  Social	  actions	  happen	  in	  time	  and	  space,	  so	  that	  the	  observed	  mix	  of	  path-­‐
dependent	  outcomes	  observed	   in	  a	  specific	  place	   is	   likely	  to	  be	  different	  from	  others	   in	  place	  elsewhere.	  
Localization	  matters	  along	  with	  history.	  Different	  regions	  may	  therefore	  be	  characterized	  by	   idiosyncratic	  
factors,	  within	  which	  one	  can	  include	  also	  the	  prevalent	  organizational	  form	  of	  enterprises.	  	  
It	  is	  clear	  that	  in	  this	  context	  the	  concept	  of	  ideal-­‐type	  firm	  is	  meaningless.	  The	  question	  as	  to	  what	  should	  
be	  the	  organizational	  form	  towards	  which	  European	  firms	  should	  converge	  can	  only	  be	  solved	  by	  accepting	  
that	  there	  may	  be	  a	  variety	  of	  locally	  optima	  equilibria,	  which	  are	  difficult	  to	  predict	  ex-­‐ante	  as	  they	  are	  the	  
result	  of	  a	  long	  lasting	  evolutionary	  process.	  
3.3 Societal	  contingency	  and	  societal	  choice	  
	  
The	   discussion	   conducted	   so	   far	   has	   showed	   that,	   besides	   more	   traditional	   approaches	   proposing	   the	  
adoption	   of	   a	   “Pareto	   superior”	   business	   form,	   different	   approaches	   grounded	   in	   economic	   history	   and	  
economics	  of	   innovation	  articulated	  a	  set	  of	  arguments	  which	   implicitly	  questioned	  the	   idea	  of	  a	  globally	  
optimum	  organization	  of	  production,	  and	  therefore	  the	   idea	   itself	  of	  a	  possible	  European	  firm.	  However,	  
such	  an	  issue	  has	  been	  explicitly	  tackled	  only	  recently	  by	  economic	  scholars.	  
The	  volume	  by	  Withley	  and	  Krinstensen	  (1996)	  represents	  a	  key	  reference	  in	  this	  respect.	  The	  book	  collects	  
different	  chapters	  developing	  a	  theoretical	  framework	  supporting	  a	  contingent	  approach	  to	  the	  issue	  in	  the	  
first	   part,	   and	   then	   provides	   an	   application	   to	   the	   investigation	   of	   the	   main	   organizational	   forms	  
characterizing	  different	  European	  countries.	  
The	   arguments	   set	   forth	   in	   The	   Changing	   European	   Firm	   are	   grounded	   on	   an	   institutional	   approach	   to	  
economics.	  Economic	  agents	  are	  therefore	  not	  characterized	  by	  complete	  rationality	  and	  profit-­‐maximizing	  
behavior.	  On	   the	   contrary,	   the	   economy	   is	   viewed	   as	   a	  web	   of	   relationships	   between	   different	   kinds	   of	  
institutional	  actors	  with	  diverging	  interests,	  in	  which	  agents’	  rationality	  is	  bounded	  to	  a	  limited	  portion	  of	  
the	  whole	  set	  of	  knowledge.	  Learning	  plays	  a	  key	  role	  in	  order	  to	  fill	  relevant	  gaps,	  so	  that	  individuals	  are	  
able	  to	  adapt	  to	  changing	  conditions	  of	  economic	  environment.	  
Within	   this	   framework,	   the	   baseline	   hypothesis	   impinges	   upon	   two	  main	   pillars.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   the	  
societal-­‐contingency	   approach	   (Sorge,	   1991;	   Withley,	   1994)	   represents	   an	   application	   of	   the	   general	  
9	  
	  
contingency	   theory,	   according	   to	   which	   effectiveness	   depends	   on	   fit	   with	   critical	   contingencies.	   In	   this	  
direction,	   firms	  may	   develop	   specific	   organizational	   forms	   due	   the	   peculiar	   features	   of	  main	   institutions	  
affecting	  economic	  behavior,	   like	   local	   labor	  markets,	   the	   rigidity	  of	   financial	  markets	   and	   the	  quality	   of	  
ownership	   and	   management	   systems.	   The	   design	   of	   such	   institutions	   may	   be	   such	   to	   override	   more	  
universalistic	   industry	   or	   technological	   factors.	   It	   follows	   that	   it	   would	   be	   pretty	   difficult	   to	   observe	   a	  
shared	   consensus	   on	   the	  most	   effective	   organizational	   form	   amongst	   such	   heterogeneous	   contexts	   like	  
European	   countries	   are.	   It	   is	   indeed	   more	   reasonable	   to	   expect	   that	   dominant	   patterns	   of	   business	  
organization	  vary	  widely	  from	  country	  to	  country,	  or	  from	  one	  business	  system	  to	  another.	  	  
On	  the	  other	  hand,	  within	  the	  institutionalist	  approach,	  the	  societal-­‐choice	  view	  argues	  that	  wile	  societal-­‐
contingency	   correctly	   push	   to	   focus	   the	   attention	   on	   the	   key	   role	   of	   institutional	   variety,	   this	   is	   not	  
sufficient	   enough	   to	   gain	   a	   full	   understanding	   of	   the	   economic	   reality.	   The	   persistence	   of	   the	   holding	  
company	  across	  different	  countries	  indeed	  call	  for	  additional	  explanations,	  able	  to	  explain	  the	  reasons	  why	  
different	   institutional	   contexts	   might	   be	   characterized	   by	   similar	   dominant	   organizational	   forms.	   In	  
particular,	  scholars	  within	  this	  framework	  put	  forth	  the	  need	  for	  a	  more	  pluralistic	  approach	  focusing	  also	  
on	   the	   features	   of	   economic	   agents	   besides	   those	   of	   the	   institutional	   settings	   in	   which	   they	   operate	  
(Whittington,	  1992).	  
Each	  context	  is	  characterized	  by	  a	  variety	  of	  actors,	  which	  differ	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  motivations	  and	  targets,	  as	  
well	  as	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  relative	  power	  within	  the	  local	  socio-­‐economic	  system.	  The	  distribution	  of	  power	  
amongst	   economic	   actors	  may	   engender	   choices	  which	   do	   not	   follow	   exactly	   capitalistic	   rules.	   Different	  
‘sociological’	  groups	  may	  be	  identified,	  like	  the	  entrepreneurs,	  the	  banks,	  the	  families	  and	  the	  State.	  On	  the	  
basis	  of	  their	  relative	  strength,	  these	  actors	  may	  choose	  strategies	  better	  suiting	  their	  own	  purposes,	  even	  
at	  costs	  of	  economic	  efficiency.	  This	  is	  a	  possible	  explanation	  for	  the	  survival	  of	  some	  specific	  organizational	  
forms	  in	  contexts	  the	  institutional	  setting	  of	  which	  would	  be	  better	  suited	  to	  host	  different	  designs.	  
It	  is	  clear	  that	  such	  set	  of	  arguments	  is	  enriched	  by	  a	  multidisciplinary	  approach	  in	  which	  institutionalism	  is	  
blended	  with	  economic	   sociology.	  The	  concept	  of	  embeddedness	   seems	   to	  be	  particularly	  appropriate	   in	  
this	  context	  (Granovetter,	  1985).	  According	  to	  this,	  economic	  action	  is	   likely	  to	  be	  influenced	  by	  concrete	  
personal	  relations	  and	  by	  their	  structures.	  The	  structure	  of	  relations	  are	  represented	  as	  a	  network	  in	  which	  
economic	   agents	   are	   connected	   to	   one	   another.	   If	   one	   allows	   for	   variety,	   rather	   than	   assuming	   a	  
representative	  economic	  agent,	  such	  networks	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  made	  of	  different	  actors,	  pursuing	  different	  
objectives	  and	  with	  different	  relative	  weight.	  	  
The	  European	  firm	  issue	  can	  therefore	  be	  framed	  in	  the	  light	  of	  embeddedness	  theory.	  This	  would	  allow	  for	  
better	  understanding	  the	  bidirectional	  flow	  of	   interactions	  from	  the	  network	  to	  the	  agent	  and	  vice	  versa.	  
The	  relationships	  between	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  network	  and	  the	  features	  of	  the	  nodes	  it	  is	  made	  of,	  opens	  
up	   a	   new	   perspective	   on	   the	   topic	   implemented	   on	   concepts	   and	   methodologies	   typical	   of	   complexity	  
theory.	  
4 A	  complexity	  perspective	  to	  addressing	  the	  European	  Firm	  issue	  
	  
Complexity	   is	   emerging	   as	   a	   new	  unifying	   theory	   to	  understand	  endogenous	   change	   and	   transformation	  
across	   a	   variety	   of	   disciplines,	   ranging	   from	  mathematics	   and	   physics	   to	   biology.	   The	   application	   of	   the	  
basic	   tools	   of	   complex	   system	   analysis	   to	   social	   sciences	   has	   recently	   lead	   to	   increasing	   attempts	   to	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implement	   an	   actual	   economics	   of	   complexity	   (Arthur,	   Durlauf,	   Lane,	   1997).	   A	   complex	   system	  may	   be	  
defined	  as	  a	  system	  that	  comprises	  many	  elements	  that	  interact	  richly	  (Simon,	  1966;	  Kauffman,	  1993).	  
One	  can	  articulate	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  organizational	  form	  taken	  by	  firms	  is	  an	  emergent	  property	  of	  a	  system	  
characterized	  by	  organized	  complexity.	  According	  to	  the	  theory	  of	  complexity,	  emergence	  is	  a	  phenomenon	  
whereby	  aggregate	  behaviors	   that	  arise	   from	  the	  organized	   interactions	  of	   localized	   individual	  behaviors,	  
provide	  both	  the	  system	  and	  the	  agents	  with	  new	  capabilities	  and	  functionalities.	  By	  organized	  complexity	  
we	  mean	  a	  system	  in	  which	  “interactions	  are	  not	   independent,	  feedback	  can	  enter	  the	  system.	  Feedback	  
fundamentally	   alters	   the	  dynamics	  of	   a	   system.	   In	   a	   system	  with	  negative	   feedback,	   changes	  get	  quickly	  
absorbed	   and	   the	   system	   gains	   stability.	   With	   positive	   feedback,	   changes	   get	   amplified	   leading	   to	  
instability”	  (Miller	  and	  Page,	  2007:50).	  
The	  implementation	  of	  such	  view	  allows	  to	  appreciate	  the	  important	  role	  of	  the	  properties	  of	  the	  system	  
into	  which	  firms	  originate	  and	  develop.	  In	  other	  words,	  considering	  the	  organizational	  form	  as	  an	  emergent	  
property	   of	   socio-­‐economic	   systems	   is	   strictly	   related	   to	   the	   issue	   of	   embeddedness.	   An	   analysis	   of	   the	  
complex	   dynamics	   of	   European	   firms	   should	   move	   from	   a	   clear	   definition	   of	   the	   system	   in	   which	   firm	  
operate.	  In	  this	  system:	  
- Economic	  agents	  are	  heterogeneous,	  which	  are	  interconnected	  and	  networked	  with	  other	  agents	  in	  
the	  system	  in	  order	  to	  exploit	  complementarities	  and	  interdependence.	  	  
- The	  heterogeneous	  agents	  are	  firms	  and	  also	  public	  and	  private	  institutions	  and	  organizations.	  
- Each	  agent	  is	  a	  network	  of	  resources	  and	  competences.	  
- The	  emergence	  of	  organizational	  forms	  stems	  from	  intentional	  choices	  by	  economic	  agents.	  	  
- The	  structure	  of	  the	  system	  change	  endogenously.	  
Consistently	   with	   the	   institutionalist	   approaches	   discussed	   in	   the	   previous	   section,	   the	   quality	   of	  
institutions,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   different	   features	   characterizing	   economic	   agents	   are	   likely	   to	   explain	   the	  
persistence	   of	   different	   type	   of	   firms	   across	   different	   countries	   in	   Europe.	   Institutions,	   families,	   banks,	  
financial	  and	  factor	  markets,	  are	  the	  typical	  nodes	  of	  a	  network	  of	   relationships	  within	  which	   firms	  carry	  
out	   their	   business.	   The	   architecture	   of	   such	   network,	   in	   terms	   of	   both	   distribution	   of	   links	   and	   relative	  
importance	  of	  nodes,	  is	  likely	  to	  shape	  emergent	  properties	  of	  system	  dynamics.	  
The	   complexity	   view	   may	   be	   pushed	   even	   further,	   by	   adopting	   the	   competence	   view	   of	   the	   firm,	   as	  
introduced	  by	  Penrose	  and	  further	  implemented	  in	  the	  capability	  approach.	  The	  firm	  itself	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  
a	  bundle	  of	  networked	  resources,	  out	  which	  there	  are	  production	  resources,	  management,	  ownership,	  and	  
so	   on	   and	   so	   forth.	   The	  way	   in	  which	   these	   components	   are	   linked	  one	   another,	   as	  well	   as	   the	   relative	  
weight	  of	  some	  of	  them,	  can	  be	  thought	  as	  features	  characterizing	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  firm	  as	  a	  network1.	  
The	  system	  dynamics	  of	  the	  components	  that	  constitute	  the	  firms	  leads	  to	  emergent	  properties	  which	  are	  
the	  performances	  of	  firms	  themselves.	  Firms	  performances	  are	  however	  a	  sort	  of	  feedback	  that	  the	  firms	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	   The	   concept	  of	   firm	  as	  a	  network	   is	  not	  new	   (see	   for	  example	  Antonelli,	   1987),	  but	   it	  has	  not	   received	  adequate	  
consideration	  from	  a	  theoretical	  viewpoint.	  The	  grafting	  of	  the	  complexity	  theory	  in	  the	  theory	  of	  the	  firm	  could	  take	  
great	  advantage	  from	  such	  a	  conceptualization.	  
11	  
	  
send	  to	  the	  system	  in	  which	  they	  operate,	  which	  in	  turn	  shape	  the	  organization	  of	  the	  firm	  and	  eventually	  
its	  performance	  again.	  It	  follows	  a	  circular	  process,	  shaped	  by	  powerful	  self-­‐enhancing	  dynamics.	  
The	   issue	   would	   be	   relatively	   simple	   if	   one	   would	   assume	   the	   structure	   of	   the	   networks,	   the	   socio-­‐
economic	   system	   and	   the	   bundle	   of	   firms’	   capabilities,	   as	   stable	   over	   time,	   or	   at	   most	   affected	   by	  
exogenous	  change,	  like	  most	  of	  the	  complexity	  thinking	  assumes.	  Yet,	  the	  architecture	  of	  a	  complex	  system	  
may	  well	  change	  over	  time,	  and	  so	  may	  the	  structure	  of	  epistatic	  relationships.	  This	  may	  occur	  either	  due	  
to	  a	  change	  in	  the	  relative	  weight	  of	  some	  elements	  in	  the	  system,	  these	  elements	  switching	  from	  a	  non-­‐
influential	  to	  an	  influential	  position,	  or	  by	  means	  of	  introduction	  of	  new	  elements	  within	  the	  system.	  This	  is	  
in	  turn	  likely	  to	  alter	  the	  existing	  structure	  of	  relationships.	  Within	  this	  context,	  the	  pleiotropy	  represents	  
the	  number	  of	  elements	  in	  the	  system	  that	  are	  affected	  by	  the	  appearance	  of	  new	  elements.	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  
the	  higher	  the	  pleiotropy,	  the	  greater	  the	  change	  in	  the	  architecture	  of	  the	  system	  that	  the	  inclusion	  of	  new	  
elements	  may	  engender.	  
The	  model	  of	  constructional	  selection	  by	  Altenberg	  (1994	  and	  1995)	  represents	  one	  of	  the	  few	  attempts	  to	  
cope	  with	   the	   issue	  of	   changing	  architectures	  of	   complex	   systems.	  Such	  class	  of	  models	   is	  well	   suited	   to	  
investigate	  the	  evolution	  of	  organizational	  forms	  considered	  as	  artefacts	  made	  of	  interdependent	  elements	  
(Lane	  and	  Maxfield,	  2005).	  The	  viewpoint	  of	  endogenous	  complexity	  makes	   the	  analysis	  of	  organizations	  
particularly	  appealing	  and	  challenging.	  The	  structure	  of	  the	  firm	  can	  indeed	  be	  represented	  as	  an	  emergent	  
property	  stemming	  from	  multi-­‐layered	  complex	  dynamics	  (see	  Figure	  1).	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  adoption	  of	  an	  
endogenous	  complexity	  made	  possible	  by	  this	  approach	  allows	  for	  the	  combination	  of	  the	  view	  on	  the	  firm	  
as	  an	  artefact	  with	  the	  view	  of	  firm	  as	  an	  act,	  i.e.	  as	  the	  product	  of	  collective	  actions	  involving	  agents	  with	  
converging	  incentives	  and	  aligned	  interests	  (Arthur,	  2009;	  Lane	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  
Figure	  1	  
	  
The	   structure	   of	   the	   network	   of	   relationships	   amongst	   interacting	   agents	   represents	   therefore	   a	   crucial	  
factor	  able	  to	  shape	  the	  ultimate	  layout	  of	  organizational	  forms.	  Constructional	  selection	  matters,	   in	  that	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new	  institutions	  entering	  the	  network	  need	  first	  of	  all	   to	  choose	  with	  which	   incumbents	  they	  want	  to	  be	  
linked	  with.	  The	  concept	  of	  preferential	  attachment	  applies	  to	  this	  situation.	  In	  a	  wide	  number	  of	  contexts,	  
the	  new	  nodes	  in	  a	  network	  generally	  end	  up	  to	  link	  with	  those	  ‘old’	  nodes	  already	  characterized	  by	  a	  large	  
number	  of	  connections	  (Barabasi	  and	  Albert,	  1999).	  As	  a	  consequence,	  the	  entrance	  of	  new	  actors	   in	  the	  
network	  is	  likely	  to	  reshape	  the	  relative	  weight	  of	  nodes,	  and	  hence	  modify	  the	  structure	  and	  the	  balance	  
of	  relationships.	  
Organizations	  so	  achieved	  stems	  from	  the	  combination	  of	  competences	  dispersed	  among	  socio-­‐economic	  
agents.	   They	   may	   be	   thought	   about	   as	   a	   collection	   of	   elements	   linked	   one	   another.	   The	   firm	   can	   be	  
therefore	  imagined	  as	  a	  network	  in	  which	  the	  nodes	  are	  competences	  or	  organizational	  units	  and	  the	  links	  
represent	  their	  actual	  combination.	  Organizational	  forms	  in	  this	  sense	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  an	  emergent	  property	  
of	  complex	  dynamics	  featuring	  the	  interdependent	  elements	  of	  the	  system.	  
This	   is	   a	   quite	   unexplored	   consequence	   of	   the	   approach	   to	   the	   European	   firm	   as	   a	   emergent	   property	  
stemming	  from	  qualified	  interactions,	  which	  provides	  further	  richness	  to	  its	  dynamics.	  Each	  organizational	  
form	  may	  be	  represented	  as	  a	  network	  the	  nodes	  of	  which	  are	  smaller	  units	  while	  the	  edges	  stand	  for	  their	  
actual	  combination.	  Hence	  each	  organization	  is	  characterized	  by	  a	  structure	  with	  its	  own	  architecture.	  This	  
in	  turn	  may	  evolve	  over	  time,	  as	  an	  effect	  of	  the	  introduction	  of	  new	  nodes	  and	  the	  consequent	  change	  in	  
their	  relative	  weight	  within	  the	  network.	  	  
Dynamic	   irreversibility	   and	   path-­‐dependence	   represent	   a	   channel	   through	   which	   the	   topology	   of	  
organization	  structure	  affects	  the	  dynamics	  at	  the	  level	  of	  agents	  networks.	  The	  organization	  of	  production	  
is	  localized	  as	  an	  effect	  of	  the	  interactions	  between	  the	  complex	  dynamics	  at	  the	  agents’	  level.	  However	  the	  
topology	   of	   the	   structure	   of	   socio-­‐economic	   system	   is	   in	   turn	   shaped	   by	   the	   choices	   made	   at	   the	  
competence	   level	   as	   to	  which	   resources	   combine	   together	  and	   in	  which	  way.	  A	   self-­‐sustained	  process	   is	  
likely	  to	  emerge,	  according	  to	  which	  the	  organization	  of	  production	  tends	  more	  and	  more	  towards	  a	  local	  
attractor	   in	   which	   they	   are	   locked	   in.	   The	   changing	   European	   firm	   can	   be	   therefore	   represented	   as	   a	  
distribution	  of	   local	  attractors	  across	  different	   localized	  contexts	  shaped	  by	   idiosyncratic	   factors,	  wherein	  
the	  changing	  conditions	  both	  in	  the	  socio-­‐economic	  system	  and	  in	  the	  architecture	  of	  firms’	  structure	  itself	  
is	  likely	  to	  produce	  variations	  over	  time.	  
At	  a	  given	  time,	  firms	  can	  select	  among	  multiple	  outcomes.	  Their	  location	  choice	  can	  be	  directed	  towards	  
different	  places	  and	  is	  influenced	  by	  both	  their	  internal	  characteristics	  that	  include	  the	  preceding	  path	  and	  
external	   characteristics	   that	   depend	   on	   the	   location	   strategies	   of	   other	   agents	   carried	   out	   in	   the	   past.	  
Hence	   the	   concentration	   of	   different	   forms	   of	   organizations	   in	   different	   places	   stemming	   from	   the	  
idiosyncratic	  factors	  of	  the	  local	  attractor	  is	  a	  path	  dependence	  process.	  
A	   number	   of	   emergent	   properties	   or	   conditions	   of	   the	   local	   system	   can	   make	   a	   place	   in	   space	   more	  
attractive	   than	   others.	   The	   interaction	   and	   networks	   of	   local	   actors	   that	   allow	   for	   the	   exploitation	   of	  
complementarities	  and	   interdependences,	   reinforced	  by	   the	   technological	  and	   industrial	   specialization	  of	  
the	  area,	  the	  institutional	  endowment	  and	  by	  a	  common	  local	  culture	  of	  trust,	  based	  on	  shared	  practices	  
and	  rules,	  are	  centripetal	  forces	  that	  make	  a	  base	  of	  attraction	  of	  the	  local	  system.	  However,	  it	  is	  not	  only	  
the	   local	   attributes	  or	   conditions	  but	   rather	   the	   sequence	  of	   cumulative	   interactions	  between	   them	  and	  
positive	   feedbacks	   that	   give	   rise	   to	   a	   local	   complex	   system.	   Both	   local	   attractiveness	   and	   accidental	  
historical	  order	  of	  choice	  generate	  agglomerations	  (Arthur	  1989,	  1994).	  	  
Once	  the	  local	  attractor	  has	  emerged	  following	  a	  path	  dependent	  process,	  heterogeneous	  agents	  within	  it	  
are	   subject	   to	   self-­‐reinforcing	  mechanisms.	   The	  process	  of	   increasing	   returns	   is	   self-­‐reinforcing	   since	   the	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benefits	  of	   remaining	   into	   the	   current	  path	  are	  higher	   than	   the	   cost	  of	   switching	   to	  an	  alternative	  path.	  
Localized	  increasing	  returns	  operate	  as	  a	  selection	  mechanism	  and	  favor	  the	  survival	  of	  firms	  and	  forms	  of	  
organization	   that	   are	   well	   established	   in	   the	   local	   system.	   Thus,	   the	   generation	   of	   different	   forms	   of	  
organizations	  is	  a	  persistent	  process.	  
The	  persistence	  of	  the	  actual	  forms	  of	  organisation	  takes	  place	  when	  the	  internal	  capabilities	  accumulated	  
by	   means	   of	   learning	   processes	   lead	   to	   the	   generation	   and	   exploitation	   of	   new	   knowledge.	   Another	  
fundamental	   condition	   to	   the	  organisational	   success	   is	  when	   the	  external	   context	  provides	   the	  access	   to	  
complementary	  and	  indispensable	  inputs	   in	  terms	  of	  external	  knowledge	  and	  capabilities.	  The	  generation	  
of	   new	   knowledge	   requires	   both	   internal	   learning	   and	   the	   acquisition	   of	   external	   tacit	   and	   codified	  
knowledge.	  	  
Firms	  are	  attracted	  towards	  and	  remain	  locked-­‐in	  the	  local	  attractor	  until	  the	  profits	  stemming	  from	  their	  
activities	  are	  above	  the	  equilibrium	  one.	  The	  selection	  mechanism	  depends	  on	  the	  profits	  realized	  by	  each	  
firm.	  Extra-­‐profits	  and	  increasing	  returns	  engender	  positive	  feedbacks	  and	  self-­‐reinforcing	  mechanisms	  that	  
sustain	  firms’	  creative	  behaviour	  and	  competitive	  advantage.	  The	  attractiveness	  of	  a	  place	  persists	  as	  long	  
as	   the	   returns	   stemming	   from	   complementarities	   and	   interdependence	   of	   capabilities	   and	   agents	   are	  
positive.	  	  
New	  forms	  of	  organisation	  can	  emerge	  when	  firms	  within	  the	  local	  attractor	  understand	  that	  the	  benefits	  
of	  remaining	  into	  the	  current	  organizational	  path,	  that	  in	  turn	  has	  engendered	  the	  current	  local	  attractor,	  
are	   lower	  than	  the	  cost	  of	  shifting	  to	  an	  alternative	  path	  and,	   thus,	   to	  an	  alternative	  attractor.	  Firms	  are	  
induced	   to	   react	   creatively	   to	   changing	   local	   conditions.	   The	   collective	   process	   of	   search	   for	   new	  
capabilities	   may	   finally	   engender	   radical	   changes	   in	   the	   organisational	   paradigm	   and	   leads	   to	  
Schumpeterian	   gales	   of	   creative	   destruction.	   Radical	   changes	   in	   the	   organisational	   paradigm	   make	   the	  
system	  moves	   unpredictably	   and	   irreversibly	   away	   from	   the	   old	   local	   attractor.	   Positive	   feedbacks	   and	  
network	  externalities	  sustain	  this	  process	  of	  change	  and	  define	  the	  basin	  of	  attraction	  of	  the	  new	  attractor.	  
5 Conclusions	  
	  
The	  debate	  about	  the	  European	  firm	  has	  recently	  attracted	  the	  attention	  of	  economic	  scholars	  specializing	  
in	  the	  theory	  of	  the	  firm.	  The	  baseline	  argument	  of	  the	  institutionalist	  approach	  to	  the	  issue	  states	  that	  it	  is	  
very	   difficult	   and	   somewhat	   simplistic	   to	   expect	   firms	   in	   the	   European	   context	   converge	   towards	   a	  
universalistic	  organization	  of	  production.	  The	  gradual	  thickening	  of	  the	  Single	  European	  Market,	  along	  with	  
globalization	  of	  production,	  does	  not	  lead	  necessarily	  to	  the	  established	  of	  a	  sort	  of	  European	  version	  of	  the	  
American	  M-­‐form	  corporation.	  
The	   institutionalist	   approach,	   drawing	   upon	   contingency	   theory,	   shows	   how	   the	   evolution	   of	   firms’	  
structure	  is	  embedded	  in	  the	  contexts	  in	  which	  they	  operate.	  The	  quality	  of	  institutions	  like	  capital	  markets,	  
banks,	  rules	  and	  norms,	   labor	  markets	  and	  financial	  resources,	   is	   likely	  to	  exert	  a	  strong	   influence	  on	  the	  
actual	   configuration	   of	   the	   organization	   of	   the	   production	   process.	   Moreover,	   the	   heterogeneity	   of	  
economic	   agents,	   in	   terms	   of	   motivation	   and	   objectives,	   provides	   explanation	   for	   the	   observation	   of	  
organizational	   forms	   hardly	   fitting	   with	   the	   environment	   in	   which	   they	   are	   placed.	   Economic	   agents,	  
consistently	   with	   behavioral	   assumptions,	   are	   not	   characterized	   by	   perfect	   rationally	   and	   may	   want	   to	  
pursue	  objectives	  which	  are	  different	  from	  profit	  maximization.	  That	  is	  why	  organizational	  forms	  which	  are	  
not	  effective	  from	  an	  economic	  viewpoint	  may	  persist	  over	  time.	  
14	  
	  
In	   this	   chapter,	   after	   having	   provided	   an	   overview	   on	   the	   ‘theories’	   of	   the	   firm,	   we	   have	   showed	   that	  
former	   contributions	   of	   main	   pillars	   of	   economic	   theory	   enable	   to	   get	   to	   the	   same	   conclusions.	   Both	  
Marshall’s	  and	  Kuznets’	  works,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  ones	  by	  Schumpeter,	  show	  that	  the	  evolution	  and	  diffusion	  of	  
specific	  organizational	  forms	  are	  strictly	  related	  to	  industrial	  peculiarities	  and	  to	  the	  features	  of	  the	  context	  
in	  which	  firms	  originate	  and	  develop.	  Such	  works	  appeared	  well	  before	  Chandler	  analyses	  supporting	  the	  
idea	  of	  a	  universalistic	  organizational	  form,	  and	  yet	  have	  been	  mostly	  neglected	  by	  theorists	  of	  the	  firm.	  
The	  basic	  idea	  that	  different	  organizational	  forms	  may	  prove	  to	  be	  equally	  efficient,	  according	  to	  the	  nature	  
of	   the	   contexts	   in	   which	   they	   operate,	   is	   very	   related	   to	   the	   concepts	   of	   multiple	   equilibria,	   dynamic	  
irreversibilities	  and	  path-­‐dependence.	  We	  have	  therefore	  proposed	  to	  extend	  to	  the	  theory	  of	  the	  firm	  the	  
recent	  tendency	  to	  apply	  the	  tools	  and	  concepts	  of	  complexity	  theory	  to	  the	  understanding	  of	  the	  origins	  
and	   evolution	   of	   organizational	   form.	   We	   have	   articulated	   an	   interpretative	   framework	   in	   which	  
organizational	   forms	   are	   emergent	   properties	   stemming	   from	  qualified	   interactions	   at	   the	   agents	   levels.	  
Organizations	  are	  in	  turn	  characterized	  by	  internal	  qualified	  interactions	  which	  feed	  back	  to	  agent	  levels.	  A	  
multilayered	   representation	  has	  been	  proposed,	  with	   two-­‐ways	   feedbacks	   flows,	   in	  which	  organizational	  
change	   and	   institutional	   change	   are	   the	   endogenous	   result	   of	   complex	   system	   dynamics.	  We	   think	   this	  
approach	  may	  be	  far	  reaching	  for	  a	  theory	  of	  the	  firm	  able	  to	  integrate	  both	  the	  variety	  of	  resources	  and	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